favoured theme of Augustan literature, largely for the opportunity it gave to stress how Rome arose out of its ashes. 20

Corpus Christi College, Oxford

 20 For the theme of Troy's destruction turned to praise of Rome *cf.* above all the *Aeneid* and Propertius iv 1.87 *Troia* cades, et *Troica Roma resurges*.

BHPICOC

In $\overline{\Lambda}$ 101-112 Agamemnon kills Isos and Antiphos, who were travelling on their chariot. They were sons of Priam, the former a vó θ oc, the latter $\gamma v \eta$ cioc. Agamemnon recognises them because earlier in the war they had been ransomed by Achilles, who, having captured them, bound them with withies on Mount Ida, where they had been tending their flocks of sheep.

The text of line 101 is not secure. Editors, Monro and Allen, for example, customarily give: $\alpha \dot{\nu} \alpha \dot{\rho} \, \dot{\rho}$ *Icov $\tau \epsilon \kappa \alpha \dot{\tau}$ Avtidov $\dot{\epsilon} \xi \epsilon \nu \alpha \rho i \zeta \omega \nu$, but several manuscripts omit $\dot{\rho}$ '. So did Zenodotos, perhaps because, as Walter Leaf insisted, $\dot{\rho}$ ' is 'quite otiose'. Leaf thought a name consisting of the simple adjective Fîcoc unlikely, adding '*Icoc, however, even without the F, is equally unknown as a proper name. 'Pficov or even 'Pîcov (another unknown name), may be right'.' Yet *Icoc should not be ruled out, since it may be toponymic: 'Der eine Priamossohn heisst *Icoc; ihn hat <E.> Maass (Herm. 24, <(1889)> 645 <-647>) scharfsinnig als Eponymen von *Icco auf Lesbos gedeutet'.²

However, Poseidippos the epigrammatist adopted a different collocation of letters. He is reported to have proposed, or to have accepted, Bhpicov,³ with-one must suppose- $\xi\xi$ evápi ξ ev to supply the missing indicative. The name Bhpicoc according to a reported statement of Aristarchos was not 'now' in the epigrams of Poseidippos, but it had stood in the so-called 'Pile' (Capóc).⁴

The problem is to explain why Poseidippos preferred Bhploov to $\beta\eta \rho'$ 'loov. The solution, I suggest, is again toponymic. In the Athenian quota lists there are named among tributaries in the Troad, in 453 and at intervals thereafter, Bhplocioi $\upsilon\pi \partial$ $\tau \eta$ "I $\delta \eta$. The spelling of their name and of their city's name is not consistent. Stephanos of Byzantion (165, 8 Meineke) has Béputic, Tpwikth $\pi \delta \lambda_{ic}$, with the *ethnikon* Beputitmc. To be compared is Bhplopoc, $\pi \delta \lambda_{ic}$ Tpwikth, with the

¹ The Iliad I (repr. Amsterdam 1971) 476. For instances of the name [•]Icoc or [•]Iccoc see R. Walzer, *Greek into Arabic* (Oxford 1962) 54-55.

² Wilamowitz, *Die Ilias und Homer* (²Berlin 1920) 185 n. 2.

³ 'ex epigrammatis sive e Soro (de Beriso)', *Supplementum Hellenisticum* 701 L.-J./P.

⁴ Schol. Ven. A $\overline{\Lambda}$ 101 (3.144, 13-16 Erbse). Ζηνόδοτος ξξω τοῦ $\overline{\rho}$ 'βῆ 'Ιcov'. μὴ ἐμφέρεςθαι δέ φηςιν ὁ 'Αρίςταρχος νῦν ἐν τοῖς Ποςειδίππου ἐπιγράμμαςι τὸν 'Βήριςον', ἀλλ'ἐν τῷ λεγομένῷ Cωρῷ εὐρεῖν. For problems concerning the Cωρός, which need not detain us here, see Gow and Page, *Hellenistic epigrams* ii (Cambridge 1965) 483-84; P. M. Fraser, *Ptolemaic Alexandria* i (Oxford 1972) 560; and Hugh Lloyd-Jones, *JHS* Ixxxiii (1963) 96. ethnikon Bhp1 θ ploc (167, 6 Meineke). Coins have BIPY,⁵ recalling the form Birytis. The city has not been identified, but J.M. Cook, after noting the frequency of BIPY coins at Ilion, was inclined to place Birytis nearby, possibly at the site on the Ballı Dağ.⁶

In taking the letters BHPICON in $\overline{\Lambda}$ 101 as one word Poseidippos understood them to be the name of the eponymous hero of the *polis* of the Bnpoctol in the Troad. Why he included an epigram for the hero in the 'Pile', but not in another work, we are not told; but doubts about the correct spelling of the placename, and so about the soundness of the grouping of letters BHPI-CON, may have caused him to change his mind. However, he was interested in at least one other hero connected with a locality in the Troad: Stephanos (295, 5 and 8-11 Meineke) cites him for the variant form Ze λ (η of Ze λ ei α and quotes from his epigram or elegy on Pandaros son of Lykaon, whom, as Aristotle seems also to have done (Fr. 151R), he may have regarded as a Lykaonian, not a Lykian.⁷

Berisos, to conclude, is a hero with little authority in the text of $\overline{\Lambda}$ 101, but behind Poseidippos' hesitant interpretation of a group of letters in the line there stood his knowledge of a real place in the Troad.

GEORGE HUXLEY

⁵ J.M. Cook, The Troad (Oxford 1973) 311.

⁶ Cook, op. cit. 357.

⁷ Suppl. Hellen. 700 L.-J./P.

Trinity College, Dublin

ούδε Λυκανίη δέξατό ςε Ζελίη

άλλὰ <παρὰ> προχοξιει Cιμουντίει τοῦτό coi * Εκτωρ εξιμα και ἀγχέμαχοι θέντο Λυκαονίδαι.

1 Λυκαονίη Meineke: Λυκάων codd. ('Nisi malis Λυκάν et sequente versu $Ze\lambda$ ίη' Meineke).

2 <παρά> Bergk: Cιμουντί ci Wilamowitz (προχοή Cιμοεντίδι Bergk): άλλα προχοή ci Cιμόεντος δια τουτό col * Εκτωρ codd. (p. 295, 10 Meineke, app.crit.).

Redistribution of land in Solon, fragment 34 West

οί δ' ἐφ' ἀρπαγήισιν ἡλθον' ἐλπίδ' εἶχον ἀφνεήν, κἀδόκ[ε]ον ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ὅλβον εὑρήσειν πολύν, καί με κωτίλλοντα λείως τραχὺν ἐκφανεῖν νόον. χαῦνα μὲν τότ' ἐφράσαντο, νῦν δέ μοι χολούμενοι λοξὸν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὀρῶσιν πάντες ῶστε δήἴον. οὐ χρεών' ἅ μὲν γὰρ εἶπα, σὺν θεοῖσιν ἤνυσα, ἄ_ιλλ_ια δ' οὺ μάτην ἕερδον, οὐδέ μοι τυραννίδος ἀνδάνει βίηι τι[..].ε[ι]ν, οὐδὲ πιεί[ρ]ης χθονὸς πατρίδος κακοῖσιν ἐσθλοὺς ἰσομοιρίην ἕχειν.

Part of the standard account of Solon's reforms is that Solon, though pressured to do so, refused to expropriate the land of the wealthy and redistribute it to the poor.¹

¹ A notable exception to this standard account is the view of G. Ferrara, *La politica di Solone* (Napoli 1964) 124-26, that Solon, *fr*. 34 W is addressed to 'nobili "demagoghi" ' who wished to take advantage of the peasants' discontent, using the peasants' support to gain riches and power for themselves, but were thwarted by Solon who did not revise the constitution to give poor and rich an equal share in government. Something of the same view appears to be expressed more briefly by T.C.W. Stinton, 'Solon, fragment 25,' *JHS* xcvi (1976) 159-62.

The sole evidence for this detail is Solon, fr. 34 W printed above, together with the comments in the Aristotelian Ath. Pol. to the effect that the demos expected a general redivision of all of the land in Attica (ό μέν γάρ δήμος φετο πάντ' άνάδαστα ποιήσειν αύτόν, 11.2; cf. περί των διανείμασθαι την γην βουλομένων, 12.3) and the comments of Plutarch (Solon 16.1-3). The comments in the Ath. Pol. appear to derive from its author's reading of fr. 34 W, which he quotes at Ath. Pol. 12.3, and Plutarch merely elaborates on the comments in the Ath. Pol. This paper will first show how the interpretation which the Ath. Pol. gives of fr. 34 W was conditioned by fourth-century ideas. It will then argue that fr. 34 W cannot be interpreted as the author of the Ath. Pol. has interpreted it. Finally it will offer a new interpretation of fr. 34 W which may shed some further light on the circumstances attending Solon's reforms.

We may begin by noting that in the fourth century the idea of redividing the land (ges anadasmos) is linked with that of cancelling debts (chreôn apokopê) by e.g. Isocrates (xii Panath. 259) and Plato (Rep. 566A; Lgg. 684E, 736C; cf. Rep. 566E). For Isocrates both measures are among the symptoms of civil strife (cf. Isoc. xii Panath. 258; similarly [Dem.] xvii 15). Plato further explains that both measures are necessary to achieve equality (to ison, Lgg. 684D), which is one of the hallmarks of democracy, and thus the popular demagogue, ό στασιάζων... πρός τούς έχοντας ούσίας, urges these measures on the mob (Rep. 565E-566A) to earn its goodwill as he moves from demagogue to tyrant (Rep. 566E). Despite these texts, however, it should be noted that as far as Athens was concerned chreôn apokope and ges anadasmos were totally imaginary threats. There is no evidence that any democrat ever proposed either measure in fourth-century Athens, and given the nature of Athenian democracy, it is difficult to imagine even the most radical demagogue doing so.² Indeed, Athenian democracy aimed only at political equality, and never at the economic egalitarianism feared by conservatives.3

No matter how unrealistic these fears were, the linked ideas of *chrebn apokope* and *ges anadasmos* nevertheless occur in the works of conservative thinkers like Isocrates and Plato⁴ often enough to suggest that they were a familiar part of the fourth-century conservative

² This point is forcefully made by P. Harding, 'Androtion's view of Solon's *seisachtheia*,' *Phoenix* xxviii (1974) 285-87.

³ This is not to deny that wealth was to some degree redistributed *de facto* through liturgies, taxes and fines which fell more heavily upon the wealthy, though this was not the intent of legislation mandating liturgies, etc., and their *de facto* redistributive effects often went unnoticed (*cf.* Arist. *Pol.* 1309^a14-20). There is a real difference between the redistribution of *money* incidentally resulting from policies whose primary aim was to tax according to one's ability to pay, and an intentional policy of *land* redistribution aimed at equalizing the primary means of producing surplus wealth. Just as no Athenian democrat ever proposed ges anadasmos, no one ever proposed *karpon anadasmos* either.

⁴ The two ideas are also found together in [Dem.] xvii 15 and in the text of the heliastic oath inserted in Dem. xxiv 149. [Dem.] xvii 15 quotes (or paraphrases) the treaty implementing the League of Corinth; since this treaty is essentially a conservative document-conservative thought not being limited to

argument against liberal democracy.⁵ Since the author of the Ath. Pol. shared this conservative perspective at least in the narrative portion of his work, it is understandable that he would interpret the seisachtheia, which involved some kind of release from the consequences of indebtedness, as a chreôn apokopê (Ath. Pol. 6.1). And since chreôn apokopé was typically linked with ges anadasmos, it was also natural for the author of the Ath. Pol. to look for evidence of land redistribution in the work of the proto-democratic Solon.⁶ This evidence, I would suggest, he thought he had found in fr. 34 W in the words oude $\pi i \epsilon i [\rho] \eta \zeta \chi \theta o v d \zeta / \pi \alpha \tau \rho i d \delta \zeta \kappa \alpha \kappa o$ ίσιν εσθλούς ισομοιρίην έχειν (vv. 8-9) which he interpreted as Solon's rejection of the kind of egalitarian redivision of the land (πάντ' ἀνάδαστα ποιήσειν, Ath. Pol. 11.2) which conservatives like Plato claimed to fear.7

Recognizing that the Ath. Pol.'s interpretation of fr. 34 W reflects fourth-century ideas weakens the authority of this interpretation, but it does not of itself prove that the interpretation is incorrect. There are, however, good reasons within fr. 34 W itself for believing that this text is not about confiscating the land of the wealthy and redistributing it to the poor. First of all, as Ferrara rightly points out,⁸ the poor might expect to have their

Athens-it is not surprising to find in it provisions against the same fears professed by Isocrates and Plato (cf. similarly the treaty's provision against δούλων απελευθερώσεις έπι νεωτερισμώ). The text of the oath in Dem. xxiv 149 is almost certainly a later interpolator's fabrication, only the beginning and end of which are likely to reflect the oath actually sworn by fourth-century jurymen (M. Fränkel, 'Der attische Heliasteneid,' Hermes xiii (1878) 452-66); in particular, the oath has jurymen promising that they will never vote for tyranny, oligarchy or chreôn apokopé and gês (and oikiôn) anadasmos, but it is difficult to envisage an occasion when jurymen qua jurymen could cast such a vote. It is possible that the archon's proclamation upon entering office that property rights will remain secure during his term (cf. Ath. Pol. 56.2) may have been intended to calm fears of democratically motivated land redistribution, but I suspect that the assurance is a more general one, that no one on any side will lose his property through stasis. 5

⁵ Cf. Isoc. vii Areopag. 31-35, where the integrity of contracts and the security of possessions are seen as characteristic of 'the good old days,' thus blending into the broader conservative theme of the patrios politeia.

⁶ For Solon as a proto-democrat in the *Ath. Pol.* see 9.1, 10.1, 41.2; for a more reasonable account see Arist. *Pol.* 1273^b35-1274^a21. More generally see A. Fuks, *The ancestral constitution* [London 1953]) 14-15 with notes for sources.

⁷ This interpretation of Solon *fr.* 34 W is not the only place in the *Ath. Pol.* where its author has been influenced by contemporary conservative speculation. The assertion at *Ath. Pol.* 13.2 that among the Ten Archons of 581 there were three *agroikoi* and two *demiourgoi* is a similar product of fifth- and fourth-century conservative theory, as indeed may be the whole episode of the Ten Archons; on this point see further L. Gernet, 'Les dix archontes de 581', RP^3 xii (1938) 216-27; P. J. Rhodes, *A commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) 183, while inclined to follow E. Cavaignac, 'La désignation des archontes athéniens jusqu'en 487,' RP^2 xlviii (1924) 145, in identifying the ten as the *prokritoi* for the archonship from each tribe divided five Eupatrids, five non-Eupatrids, also rejects as a late invention the tripartite membership described by Aristotle.

⁸ Ferrara (n. 1) 120.

lot improved somewhat by a redistribution of land, but $\kappa\dot{\alpha}\delta\delta\kappa$ [E]ov $\xi\kappa\alpha\sigma\tauo\zeta \alpha\dot{\nu}\tau\omega\nu \frac{\delta\lambda\beta\sigma\nu}{\delta\lambda\beta\sigma\nu}$ εύρήσειν $\pi\sigma\lambda\dot{\nu}\nu$ (v. 2) would certainly be an overstatement of their expectations, and it is unlikely that someone as attentive to the issue of wealth as Solon was would make such a mistake. More generally, vv. 1-2 sound as if they are describing a relatively small number of people who somehow expected to profit greatly from Solon's work, and not a substantially larger group (viz. the poor peasant population as a whole) who would be individually benefited in a more limited way by wholesale land redistribution. Indeed vv. 1-2 of fr. 34 W should be compared with fr. 4 W, vv. 12-13:

ούθ' ίερων ούτέ τι δημοσίων

φειδόμενοι κλέπτουσιν άφαρπαγήι άλλοθεν άλλος

where the reference is clearly to the rapacious rich (cf. v. 11), and not to the poor. 9

Further, of the occasions on which we know that land was actually distributed, at least up to the late fourth century, all for which we have reliable evidence¹⁰ were either the allocation of conquered or otherwise unoccupied land, as in the division of land among colonists,¹¹ or the consequences of civil strife, where the winners helped themselves to the property of the losers.¹² The earliest reference we find in our texts to confiscating the land of the wealthy for redistribution to the poor is at Plato, *Rep.* 565E-566A which does not refer to any historical event but is a vehicle for Plato's political theorizing. Plato and those who thought like him were certainly aware that in *staseis* winners often confiscated the property of losers, and this awareness may have

⁹ For what it may be worth, the expression $\epsilon \phi' \alpha \rho \pi \alpha$ γαίσι also occurs at Eur. *Herc.* 591 speaking of rich layabouts who have spent themselves poor and now support Lycus in the hope of gaining wealth $\epsilon \phi' \alpha \rho \pi \alpha \gamma \alpha i \sigma u$ των πελας; cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Euripides: Herakles* (Berlin 1889) ad loc., who cites, for the type, Plato, *Rep.* 555D on impoverished *ouk agenneis*.

¹⁰ Plutarch's account of events after Dion gained control of Syracuse in 356 includes the detail that Dion's rival Herakleides put up 'one of the demagogues' to undermine Dion's popularity with the demos by proposing ges anadasmos, on the grounds that 'equality was the beginning of freedom while poverty was the beginning of slavery for those without possessions' (Plut. Dion 37.5; cf. 48.6 which refers to redistribution of land and houses). Plutarch's account, however, is seriously distorted by his desire to portray Dion as a victim of radical democrats and, pace A. Fuks, 'Redistribution of land and houses in Syracuse in 356 BC, and its Ideological Aspects,' CQ xviii (1968) 207-23, the passage probably tells us more about Plutarch's views of democracy, views shaped by the texts discussed above, than it does about the arguments and events in Syracuse in 356 BC. The account of these same events in Diodorus Siculus xvi 16-17 makes no mention of land redistribution.

¹¹ E.g. Hdt. vi 159. Note also Meiggs-Lewis 13 ('A Lokrian community settles new territory: (?)525-500 BC'), lines 7-14, which prohibit subsequent attempts to upset the original distribution which is the principal subject of the law (cf. *IG* i ³ 46, lines 20-26, for similar provisions for the Athenian colony at Brea). The most famous distribution of conquered land is of course the allocation to Spartiates of *klêroi* in Messenia.

¹² E.g. Thuc. viii 21. D. Asheri, *Distribuzione di terre nell' antica Grecia* (Torino 1966), provides an extensive list of occasions upon which land was distributed in ancient Greece, with discussions of the reasons for these distributions. provided the raw material for their theorizing. But in this theorizing, as we find it reflected in the Laws and the Republic, land redistribution is not only a way of rewarding successful partisans; it is also, as we have seen, a means, together with debt cancellation, of advancing an ideological agenda of economic egalitarianism. Theorizing of this sort clearly reflects a response to the democratic emphasis on political equality, and because of this it cannot be older than the ideology of democratic equality which itself emerged only in the course of the fifth century.¹³ The concept of democratic equality (that all men are politically equal) evolved from that of aristocratic equality (that all in the governing class are politically equal), but the two are not the same, and neither approaches the conservative claim that democratic equality requires all men to be economically equal. The author of the Ath. Pol., however, accepted the conservative construction of ges anadasmos, that all the land is to be redivided on an egalitarian basis (cf. πάντ' ἀνάδαστα, 11.2), and he read fr. 34 W assuming that with κακοίσιν έσθλούς ίσομοιρίην έχειν (v. 9) Solon was thinking in terms of democratic economic equality, when for Solon even the simpler concept of democratic political equality did not yet exist.

Finally, by paraphrasing kakoisin and esthlous (fr. 34 W, v. 9) as demos and hoi gnorimoi (Ath. Pol. 11.2), the author of the Ath. Pol. also shows that he has read fr. 34 W as if it described a society like that of his own day, where the members of the elite were distinguished from the masses by their wealth and style of life, but not necessarily by their birth. If one assumes, as the author does, that hoi kakoi = ho demos = 'the poor' and hoi esthloi = hoi gnorimoi = 'the rich' it is easy to read fr. 34 W as referring to land redistribution for the benefit of the poor. However, the simple equation of kakoi = 'poor' and esthloi = 'rich' is not only unparalleled in other sixth-century texts but it is also contradicted by Solon himself when he says elsewhere $\pi o \lambda \lambda o i \gamma \alpha \rho$ πλουτέουσι κακοί, άγαθοι δε πένονται.¹⁴ From a sixth-century aristocratic perspective, well illustrated in the slightly later poems of Theognis, agathoi = esthloi as a social term describes the old aristocracy based on birth, breeding and behavior, while kakoi describes all those outside the agathoi.¹⁵ Of course most agathoi were

 13 I have discussed the emergence of the concept of democratic equality and its relation to aristocratic equality in 'The tyrant in Athenian democracy,' *QUCC* xxx 3 (1988) 46-52.

¹⁴ Fr. 15 W, v. 1. Agathoi are normally wealthy, kakoi normally are not. The point of the verse is that the normal order of things has been upset, and that some kakoi have gained wealth (while remaining kakoi) and some agathoi have lost their wealth (while remaining agathoi), not that even poor people can be morally good. For the unhappy state of the impoverished agathos cf. e.g. Theog. 173-80, 929-30.

¹⁵ The use of the terms *esthlos* = *agathos* and *deilos* = *kakos* elsewhere in the surviving fragments of Solon's poems is consistent with the interpretation given here, that *esthlos* = *agathos* refers to the hereditary aristocracy and that *deilos* = *kakos* refers to anyone outside the circle of *agathoi*, including wealthy landed non-aristocrats. (*Fr.* 13 W, v. 33 [*agathos, kakos*], v. 39 [*agathos, deilos*]; *fr.* 15 W, v. 1 [*agathos, kakos*]; *fr.* 36 W, v. 18 [*agathos, kakos*]. Note especially *fr.* 13 W, v. 39 in contrast with vv. 41-42, and *fr.* 15 W, vv. 1-4. *Esthlos* is used only in fr. 34 W, v. 9 to indicate social status.) For the use of the terms in the Theognid poems see the discussion of G. Cerri, 'La

wealthy, and most *kakoi* poor,¹⁶ but at least a few *kakoi* became relatively wealthy, and their their use of their wealth to intrude upon the prerogatives, political and social, of the *agathoi* gave rise to the social tensions reflected in the Theognid poems. The assumption that all *agathoi/esthloi* were 'rich' and that all *kakoi* were 'poor' ignores these wealthier *kakoi*.¹⁷

As we saw earlier, vv. 1-2 of our fragment appear to refer to a relatively small group of men who had expected to profit greatly from Solon's work of reform. Further, the structure of the fragment leads us to identify this small group of men with the *kakoi* who did not receive $\chi\theta\sigma\nu\partial\zeta$ $\pi\alpha\tau\rho1\delta\sigma\zeta$... $1\sigma\sigma\mu\sigma\rho1\eta\nu$ with *esthloi* in vv. 8-9. Since these *kakoi* are a relatively small group, they cannot be the non-aristocratic population as a whole, but must be a smaller subset of the latter. In what follows I will argue that the *kakoi* in our fragment were in fact relatively wealthy non-aristocrats much like those referred to in the Theognid poems.¹⁸

That in the Athens of Solon's day there were some non-aristocrats wealthy enough to qualify for public office but excluded by their low birth from full participation in government¹⁹ is shown by the nature of Solon's political reforms which shifted qualification for public office from the twin criteria of birth and wealth (àpιστίνδην καὶ πλουτίνδην, Ath. Pol 3.1, 3.6) to the sole criterion of wealth.²⁰ If this shift responded to

terminologia sociopolitica di Teognide: I. L'opposizione semantica tra agathos-esthlos e kakos-deilos,' QUCC vi (1968) 7-32.

¹⁶ And doubtless many *agathoi* (e.g. Theog. 525-26) thought they all deserved to be.
¹⁷ On these relatively wealthy *kakoi* see C. G. Starr, *Individ*-

¹⁷ On these relatively wealthy kakoi see C. G. Starr, Individual and community: the rise of the polis 800-500 BC (New York and Oxford 1986) 93-96, drawing especially on Theognis. Starr's language here could suggest that only relatively wealthy non-aristocrats were called kakoi (hence the critique of P. Millett, 'Hesiod and his world,' PCPS xxx (1984) 88-90; Starr is a bit clearer in CAH² 3.3 (1970) 432, that all non-aristocrats were kakoi, some of whom were relatively wealthy.

¹⁸ In all likelihood the subjects of the poem were identified in sufficient detail in the earlier, now lost, part of the poem where Solon probably told how he had urged moderate expectations upon them, 'but they...' (ot δ ', v. 1).

¹⁹ The question of how a family became qualified by birth for public office in pre-Solonic Athens lies outside the scope of this paper, but I would suggest that in the traditional society of archaic Athens the essential criterion was gradual acceptance by the other members of the privileged political class (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 8.2); that wealth had a great deal to do with this acceptance; that acceptance, once achieved, was then passed down from father to son, to be lost only when the family's wealth was dissipated or the family itself died out; and that as some families rose in wealth and others fell, their changing relative fortunes were responsible for tensions in Athens not unlike those we see in the Theognid poems. On the absence of a closed Eupatrid 'caste' see most recently T. J. Figueira, 'The ten *archontes* of 579/8 at Athens,' *Hesperia* liii (1984) 954-59.

²⁰ For the argument is this paragraph see especially C. Hignett, A history of the Athenian constitution to the end of the fifth century BC (Oxford 1952) 102-7; see also A. Andrewes, CAH^2 , vol. iii 3, 384-85. Athenian society may have been organized into hippeis, zeugitai and thetes, presumably for military purposes, before Solon, but the use of these categories (with the addition of the pentakosiomedimnoi) to determine eligibility for political office was Solon's innovation, as was also possibly the definition of these categories in terms of specific amounts of agricultural produce.

a particular socio-political reality (as we must believe it did), then before the shift there must have been some people as wealthy as at least the poorest of those eligible for political office but without their family credentials, i.e. there must have been at least some comparatively rich *kakoi*. Further, since the Solonic categories are defined in terms of agricultural produce, the wealth of these comparatively rich non-aristocrats must have been in land, specifically in land which they directly owned and perhaps also in land owned by others of which they were able to control all or part of the produce for their own economic benefit. That their wealth was primarily landed wealth is exactly what our limited knowledge of the early sixth-century Athenian economy would lead us to expect.²¹

Hignett has speculated that these comparably rich landed non-aristocrats were dynasts from the outlying regions of Attica.²² According to Hignett's view, Solon's reforms may have been meant to benefit men prominent in regions only recently incorporated into the Athenian state who had not yet been accepted into Athens' ruling circle, a circle which still consisted only of hereditary aristocrats from in and near the city. Without excluding this 'regionalist' hypothesis entirely, I would offer an alternative which is at least in part compatible with it, that some wealthier kakoi may also have belonged to families whose wealth was not as old as that of the aristocrats. Such newly prosperous non-aristocratic families could have begun as relatively small landholders but in recent generations would have increased their economic power, and eventually their holdings at the expense of their fellow farmers. There is, after all, no reason to assume, for example, that only aristocrats of long standing made loans of seed and grain to small farmers who had fallen on hard times; other small holders who were better farmers, or luckier, would also have been in a position to make loans in kind to their unfortunate fellows in return for a share of their future crops, and such loans, if not made good could, from modest beginnings, in time reduce some debtors to dependent status and perhaps even cost them their land.²³ The picture we normally draw of pre-Solonian Athens has a large number of dependent peasant farmers exploited to varying degrees by rich aristocratic landowners. I would suggest that this picture needs correct-

 21 For land ownership as the primary basis of wealth at this time see C. G. Starr, *The economic and social growth of early Greece 800-500 BC* (New York 1977) 124-26.

²² Hignett (n. 20) 103-5. See also J. R. Ellis and G. R. Stanton, 'Factional conflict and Solon's reforms,' *Phoenix* xxii (1968) 97-98; more generally see R. Sealey, 'Regionalism in Archaic Athens,' *Historia* ix (1960) 155-75.

²³ Dependency could also arise from non-economic factors, e.g. a weaker man's desire for a stronger man's protection, or the stronger's pressure upon the weaker. Whatever the cause of the dependency, one form of its acknowledgement, possibly a traditional one, was the compulsory payment by the dependent of a part of his produce (cf. W. G. Forrest, *The emergence of Greek democracy* [London 1966] 150, though not all these relations of dependence need be as old as the Dark Ages as Forrest would have it), and this obligation, if not met, could, again, eventually lead to the dependent's loss of his land. For a more detailed account of how such developing dependency might work see A. French, 'The economic background to Solon's reforms,' CQ vi (1956) 17-19, though I do not feel it ing in that the wealthy exploiters may have been both agathoi and kakoi (whether we understand the exploitative kakoi to have been Hignett's regional dynasts, the more recently prosperous farmers envisaged here, or both), and that the *seisachtheia* was meant to address the abuses of all these exploiters, whether they were aristocrats or not.²⁴

Returning to fr. 34 W, we saw earlier that its opening lines were likely to refer to a relatively small group of men who anticipated great personal benefits for themselves once Solon got into office. More precisely, while Solon spoke moderately at one point, presumably before he became archon, this small group fully expected him to do something far more radical after his election, and they were angered when he kept to the more moderate program he had announced and did not carry out the measures they had expected (vv. 3-6). What were these radical measures?

In vv. 7-8 Solon says οὐδέ μοι τυραννίδος / άνδάνει βίηι τι[..].ε[ι]ν. The word τυραννίδος suggests that the men described in vv. 1-2 expected Solon to use his position to become tyrant, or at least to act like a tyrant. Now tyranny made the tyrant not only powerful but also wealthy (cf. e.g. Solon, fr. 33 W, vv. 5-6), and on the time-honored principle of helping one's friends and harming one's enemies, the tyrant could also be expected to reward his supporters (cf. e.g. Theog. 823) at the expense of those who had opposed him. It is possible then that the men described in vv. 1-2 were Solon's supporters who expected him to reward them for their support once he became tyrant.²⁵ On this reading πιεί[ρ]ης χθονός / πατρίδος κακοίσιν έσθλούς ισομοιρίην έχειν (vv. 8-9) would refer to confiscating the property of those among the old aristocracy (esthloi = agathoi) who would have opposed Solon had he sought to become tyrant, and redistributing this property to Solon's supporters from among the kakoi.²⁶

But which *kakoi*? If we are talking about a relatively small group of men, as vv. 1-2 suggest we are, then only relatively *wealthy* individuals would be able to muster enough *de facto* political power²⁷ to make a real

necessary to accept French's principal thesis, that the crisis faced by Solon was precipitated by the ecological consequences of a switch, prompted by population pressures, from a meat- to grain-based diet; the year-to-year hazards of subsistence agriculture would be enough to catch some farmers short.

 24 It has been argued by O. Murray, *Early Greece* (Brighton 1980) 184, correctly I believe, that what had begun as a traditional dependence structure came to be exploited by aristocrats in the late seventh century to fund a new, and expensive, aristocratic lifestyle. I would only add that the dependence structure could also be exploited by up-and-coming non-aristocrats who were even more motivated to imitate the aristocrat lifestyle by their desire to be accepted by the aristocrats (*cf.* n. 19).

²⁵ On this see further Andrewes (n. 20) 382.

 26 Fr. 32 W., in which Solon speaks of sparing the ges... patridos and of rejecting tyranny, may similarly mean that he refused to become tyrant and reward his supporters with land confiscated from his opponents.

²⁷ Political power is here understood as the ability to get things done in the political sphere (*cf.* the adjective *dunatoi* elsewhere used to describe the politically powerful). It does not necessarily require access to magistracies, but can operate equally well through influence, particularly in a small oligarchic state such as Athens was in the early sixth century.

difference.²⁸ In any event, while there may have been mass dissatisfaction among the poor, a mass movement of the poor is quite unlikely. The society of early sixth-century Athens was organized vertically, as it were, with most Athenians dependent in some fashion on one or other of a comparatively few powerful men through whom they were integrated only indirectly into the community at large.²⁹ In a society of this sort it is difficult to imagine how a mass movement of the poor organized horizontally by class across the community, with or without leaders from the elite, could ever arise.

If our understanding of fr. 34 W is correct, then something like the following is likely to have occurred:

1. Solon proposed a political reform (sc. timocratic qualification for office) which would benefit wealthier landed non-aristocrats, possibly to gain their support for economic proposals (sc. the *seisachtheia*) which would help poor dependent farmers.³⁰

2. At least some wealthier landed non-aristocrats supported Solon hoping for more than political benefits for themselves, specifically that in tyrannical fashion Solon would confiscate the land of his political opponents and distribute it to his supporters.

3. Solon became archon with the support of these wealthier non-aristocrats and enacted both economic measures (sc. the *seisachtheia*) which helped the dependent poor who needed them, and political measures which benefited the wealthier non-aristocrats; but he did not seize the property of his political opponents to distribute to his supporters, against whose angry disappointment he now defended himself in fr. 34 W.

In sum, the notion that Solon considered and rejected redistributing land to the poor comes from the interpretation of Solon, Fr. 34 W given in the Aristotelian *Ath. Pol.*, but the language of fr. 34 W itself does not support such an interpretation. fr. 34 W is more likely to describe Solon's unwillingness to seize the land of his opponents and use it to reward his friends.

Fairfield University

VINCENT J. ROSIVACH

²⁸ One might object that if the estates of the *esthloi* passed over to wealthy *kakoi*, the result could hardly be characterized as *isomoirit* between the two. In reply it could be argued that even if Solon had confiscated property, he would have confiscated that of only some of the *esthloi*, viz. those who had opposed his tyranny, while other *esthloi* would have remained in possession of theirs; in this case *isomoirit* would still denote a rough equality between the possessions of individual *kakoi* (viz. those who received the confiscated estates) and individual *esthloi* (viz. those whose estates had not been confiscated). The absence of articles with KOKOLOW and $\epsilon \sigma \theta \lambda o \delta c$ may indicate that the comparison is between some *esthloi* and some *kakoi*, and not between *hoi esthloi* (or *ho esthlos*) and *hoi kakoi* (or *ho kakos*) as inclusive categories.

 29 Cf. the description of archaic Greek society given by Forrest (n. 23) 48-49.

³⁰ Whatever the *seisachtheia* was, it would have affected wealthy landed *agathoi* and wealthy landed *kakoi* alike. Conceivably this was a price which at least some wealthy landed *kakoi* were willing to pay for access to public office through Solon's political reform. In any event, the effects of the *seisachtheia* could not have been too radical, or they would not have been accepted by the landed interest, noble and ignoble, which dominated early sixth-century Athenian society.